We develop a dimension theory for D-semianalytic sets over an arbitrary non-Archimedean complete field. Our main results are the equivalence of several notions of dimension and a theorem on additivity of dimensions of projections and fibers in characteristic 0. We also prove a parameterized version of normalization for D-semianalytic sets.

The theory of algebraically closed non-Archimedean valued fields is proved to eliminate quantifiers in an analytic language similar to the one used by Cluckers, Lipshitz, and Robinson. The proof makes use of a uniform parameterized normalization theorem which is also proved in this paper. This theorem also has other consequences in the geometry of definable sets. The method of proving quantifier elimination in this paper for an analytic language does not require the algebraic quantifier elimination theorem of Weispfenning, unlike the (...) customary method of proof used in similar earlier analytic quantifier elimination theorems. (shrink)

"The Spanish original, 'La rebelión de las masas,' was published by 1930; this translation, authorized by Sr. Ortega y Gasset, remains anonymous at the translator's request." Contents: 1. The Coming of the Masses 2. The Rise of the Historical Level 3. The Height of the Times 4. The Increase of Life 5. A Statistical Fact 6. The Dissection of the Mass-Man Begins 7. Noble Life and Common Life, or Effort and Inertia 8. Why the Masses Intervene in Everything, and Why (...) Their Intervention is Solely by Violence 9. The Primitive and the Technical 10. Primitivism and History 11. The Self-Satisfied Age 12. The Barbarism of “Specialisation” 13. The Greatest Danger, the State 14. Who Rules the World 15. We Arrive at the Real Question. (shrink)

The ‘four famous cruces’ of this satire are as interesting as notorious. I regard the first as solved, since I cannot imagine anybody improving upon Postgate's line 13 . But I find instead a hitherto undetected but quite palpable flaw in the opening words.

CON: CUADROS CRONOLÓGICOS / INTRODUCCIÓN / TEXTOS ÍNTEGROS / BIBLIOGRAFÍA / NOTAS / LLAMADAS DE ATENCIÓN / DOCUMENTOS / ORIENTACIONES PARA EL ESTUDIO En septiembre de 1925 Ortega y Gasset reunió en un volumen dos importantes y polémicos ensayos, LA DESHUMANIZACIÓN DEL ARTE e IDEAS SOBRE LA NOVELA, textos que se inscriben en la tarea que se había impuesto el filósofo de interpretar la nueva época cultural que había comenzado con el siglo XX, una época que vive una crisis, la (...) crisis de la razón ilustrada, que afecta a todos los aspectos de la vida europea, dado que se ha producido una ruptura de los valores sobre los que se había venido sustentado la civilización occidental. Ambos ensayos, en parte complementarios, tienen, sin embargo, una orientación distinta. LA DESHUMANIZACIÓN DEL ARTE aborda temas relacionados con todas las manifestaciones del arte nuevo y se refiere, sobre todo, a las artes plásticas, aunque también se aluda a la literatura o a la música; el segundo se centra en un único género literario, la novela. Pero ambos están enlazados por una idea común, el agotamiento de las formas artísticas del pasado, especialmente las del siglo XIX, con el abuso de lo sentimental y de lo narrativo, ha conducido a los artistas jóvenes a evitar la mimesis de la realidad y a convertir el objeto artístico (cuadro, composición musical, poema o novela) en una creación puramente estética que no ha de explicarse como copia de la realidad. (shrink)

The current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has killed thousands across the world. SARS-CoV-2 is the latest but surely not the last such global pandemic we will face. The biomedical response to such pandemics includes treatment, vaccination, and so on. In this paper, though, we argue that it is time to consider an additional strategy: the somatic (non-heritable) enhancement of human immunity. We argue for this approach and consider bioethics objections we believe can be overcome.

In his paper ‘On what there’s not’, Joseph Melia disavows commitment to the existence of objects like average mothers, possibilities, numbers, etc. Since quantification over such objects is at times unavoidable, Melia tries to argue that we can deny the existence of such objects despite the fact that our (true) theories of the world quantify over them. Melia calls this ‘weaseling’. In this paper, I argue that these assumptions of Melia’s render his position incoherent.

Nazariyat, Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences, issued twice a year in English and Turkish (Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi), is a refereed international journal. It publishes original studies, critical editions of classical texts and book reviews on Islamic philosophy, kalām, theoretical aspects of Sufism and the history of sciences. The goal of Nazariyat is to contribute to the discovery, examination and reinterpretation of the theoretical traditions in the history of Islamic thought, by giving (...) special attention to the post-classical period of it. **ISSN: 2148-8088 E-ISBN: 2547-9415**. (shrink)

On οδ γγελός τίς κτλ. Jebb writes: ‘The sentence begins as if γγελός were to be followed by λθε:but the second alternative, συμπράκτωρ όδοû suggests κατεȋδε [had seen, though he did not speak]: and this, by a kind of zeugma, stands as verb to γγελος also.’ In support he cites only an atrocious zeugma from the MS. text of Hdt. iv. 106; but this has been corrected, as anyone may now see who will examine the text and apparatus of chs. (...) 106 and 107 as presented in Hude's edition. (shrink)

Sufficient conditions are given under which ratifiable acts exist.

We live in a circular universe, of which each item must be defined in terms of other items, ultimately of its complement-opposite, by their mutual limitation. The employment of abstract, formally consistent, thought in this work is quite inadequate.thought is not metaphysically valid, because its formal consistency forces it to ignore—which in the realm of pure reason is tantamount to denying—some pertinent elements of reality—experience, and then implicitly at once and perhaps explicitly later to recognize the ignored elements, and thus (...) be unconsciously inconsistent with itself. Therefore mankind is forced to undertake the monumental task of constructing a philosophical method of thought which does not strive after formal consistency and so which is able as constantly as may be consciously to express both the recognized and the ignored elements of reality—experience, that is, in ontological terms, being and non-being, and the consistent and the inconsistent elements in thought. This the needed method can do only by relating items by their mutual restraint or measurement of various kinds and degrees, as will be explained below. To put the essential matter bluntly: philosophers must seek to learn discursively what scientists have always known intuitively—that the ultimate method of discovering truth is measurement, not abstract consistency. The proposed method must not, however, interfere with the rhetorical ordering of material, which must contain a conscious element of pure consistency, as will also be explained below. (shrink)

The paper advances a Humean metaethical analysis of "intrinsic value" - a notion fundamental in moral philosophy in general and particularly so in environmental ethics. The analysis reduces an object's moral properties (e.g., its value) to the empirical relations between the object's natural properties and people's psychological dispositions to respond to them. Moral properties turn out to be both objective and subjective, but in ways compatible with, and complementary to, each other. Next, the paper investigates whether the Humean analysis can (...) support non-anthropocentric environmental ethical theories, which attribute intrinsic value to nonhuman natural entities. It argues that one of the most useful resources from Hume for non-anthropocentrism is his account of justice as an artificial virtue, which is a plausible model for the internalization of various environmentally friendly conventions and the creation of environmental values. Finally, the paper concludes that any Humean account of intrinsic value is empiricist all the way down. Moral questions about what things are intrinsically valuable, and to what extent they are so, are ultimately empirical questions about complex psychological capacities and dispositions of human beings, which cannot be single-handedly answered by philosophers a priori; and that ethics is more appropriately seen as an interdisciplinary investigation, requiring collaboration among the various psychological and social sciences, human biological and neurological sciences, and history and philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe Daodejing is an ancient Chinese text traditionally taken as a representative Daoist classic expressing a distinctive philosophy from the Warring States Period . This essay explicates the ethical dimensions of the DDJ paying attention to issues related to war and peace. The discussion consists of four parts: “naturalness” as an onto‐cosmological argument for a philosophy of harmony, balance, and peace; war as a sign of the disruption of the natural pattern of things initiated by the proliferation of desire; defensive (...) war and appropriate war conduct required when one has to be involved in warfare; and the natural and spontaneous way of living that would prevent war from happening in the first place. This essay attempts to show that what makes the DDJ different from other military texts, or what is called the “art of war corpus” in China is that the discourse of war and warfare in the DDJ is presented via its unique understanding of peace at the personal and social levels. The DDJ is meant to be an inquiry into an effective method to prevent war from happening amid a world full of selfish interests and excessive desires. It proposes that peace is not only a condition in which there is freedom from war and overt violence, but a state of harmony that marks human life and its betterment. (shrink)

The Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency found in Wonderful Life can be dissected into three premises: palaeontological, macro-evolutionary, and developmental. Discussions of evolutionary contingency have revolved primarily around the developmental. However, a shift in methodological practice and new palaeontological evidence subsequent to the book’s publication appears to threaten the palaeontological premise that asserts high Cambrian disparity, or, roughly, that morphological differences between the Cambrian species were high. This presents a prima facie problem: Did the Cambrian consist of enough anatomical variety (...) to fuel a different outcome upon a replay of the tape of life? I investigate the role that disparity plays in the Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency and conclude that the reduced disparity view does not undermine the argument, per se. As for the macro-evolutionary premise, Gould never offers any explicit justification for the idea that species sorting was indiscriminate or ‘lottery-like’ (though he certainly gestures at it). Putting aside the exegetical, I consider certain empirical avenues for underwriting the macro-evolutionary premise and argue that the most plausible route is to appeal to the special status of mass extinctions, a move that is not entirely unfamiliar to macro-evolutionists. That is, mass extinctions can be good sources of contingency due to their being ‘chancy’ in at least three respects. In sum, I update the palaeontological and macro-evolutionary premises as to reconstrue the Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency in its strongest form. (shrink)

A general theory of acts leads to a theory of cognition distinguishing between formation of apriorical knowledge about values, norms, and cognitive beliefs, based on conditioning by means of rewards and punishments, and formation of aposteriorical knowledge based on conscious, theoretical analysis of observations. The latter, rational layer of consciousness can be built on the former, irrational layer only, if certain conditions are fulfilled. It is shown that rational cognition of values presupposes a notion of aposteriorical value, which challenges some (...) conventions of the 'value-free' social science, in particular, the so called guillotine of Hume. (shrink)